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RUSSIAN PROTECTIONISM AND THE
STRATEGIC SECTORS LAW
BY WILLIAM E. POMERANZ*
A perennial cloud seems to hang over the topic of Russia and
international trade. Therefore, as Russia contemplates tough
economic times ahead, and the growing risk of protectionism, I want
to begin on an overall upbeat note. For all of the obstacles to foreign
investment in Russia—and they are considerable and will be
discussed below—Russia nevertheless has stood out as a relatively
good destination for foreign goods and services for most of the past
decade. Foreign direct investment (“FDI”) jumped from $2.4 billion
in 2001 to $36.1 billion in 2007.1 Similarly, the value of Russian
imports increased from $53.8 billion in 2001 to $225.3 billion in
2007.2 Critics may argue that the FDI numbers could have been even
better if Russia addressed certain fundamental structural deficiencies

* William Pomeranz is the Deputy Director of the Kennan Institute, a part of the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars located in Washington, D.C.
In addition, he teaches Russian law at the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East
European Studies, Georgetown University. Prior to joining the Kennan Institute,
Dr. Pomeranz practiced international law in the United States and Moscow, Russia.
He also served as Program Officer for Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus at the National
Endowment for Democracy from 1992-1999. Dr. Pomeranz holds a B.A. from
Haverford College, a M.Sc. from the University of Edinburgh, a J.D. cum laude
from American University, and a Ph.D. in Russian history from the School of
Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London. Dr. Pomeranz’s
research interests include Russian legal history as well current Russian commercial
and constitutional law. Recent publications include: President Medvedev and the
Contested Constitutional Underpinnings of Russia’s Power Vertical, 17
DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, Spring 2009, at 179, and Supervisory Review and Finality of
Judgments under Russian Law, 34 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 15 (2009).
1. U.S.–Russia Business Council, Russian Economic Indicators,
https://www.usrbc.org/resources/Russianeconomicindicators (last visited Nov. 29,
2009).
2. Id.
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(corruption, unclear laws, lack of infrastructure, etc.). Nevertheless,
the above statistics testify to the growing attractiveness of the
Russian market just prior to the 2008 financial crisis.
Another piece of relatively good news is that, at least rhetorically,
Russia did not call for protectionism in the immediate aftermath of
the 2008 financial crash.3 In January 2009 at the Davos summit,
Prime Minister Putin struck most of the right notes: “The leaders of
the world’s largest economies agreed during the November 2008
G20 summit not to create barriers hindering global trade and capital
flows. Russia shares these principles.”4 Putin proceeded to reject
financial populism and excessive state interventionism as possible
solutions to Russia’s economic woes, adding that Russia should not
repeat the mistaken policies of the Soviet Union.5
Yet despite voicing the right sentiments, Russia nevertheless
remains vulnerable to reneging on its foreign trade commitments and
moving toward protectionism. In August 2008, for example, Prime
Minister Putin first suggested that Russia was considering going
back on some of its World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
commitments, most notably in the area of agriculture.6 This
statement carried major economic consequences, since agricultural
subsidies have been a major stumbling block in Russia’s seemingly
3. See Stephen Sestanovich, Russia and the Global Economic Crisis,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17844/
(contrasting Russia’s protectionist response to the 1998 economic crisis with the
current leadership’s emphasis on greater participation in the global economy).
4. Vladimir Putin, Russ. Prime Minister, Speech at the Opening Ceremony of
the World Economic Forum (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.weforum.org/
pdf/AM_2009/OpeningAddress_VladimirPutin.pdf.
5. See id. (arguing that the Soviet Union’s policy of complete economic
intervention made its economy “totally uncompetitive”).
6. See Anna Smolchenko, Putin Eyes Retreat on WTO Accords, MOSCOW
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2008 (reporting that Putin has publicly stated that Russia will not
sacrifice its own economic interests in favor of expedited WTO accession); see
also David Tarr, Russian WTO Accession: What Has Been Accomplished, What
Can Be Expected 8-9 (World Bank Dev. Res. Group Trade Team, Policy Res.
Working Paper No. 4428, 2007), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2007/12/04/000158349_200712041
05142/Rendered/PDF/wps4428.pdf (offering a brief history of Russia’s WTO
accession process and asserting that agricultural subsidies remain a particular point
of contention).
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eternal (sixteen years and counting) quest to join the WTO.7 Putin’s
statement, in turn, most likely was provoked by the comments of
then-U.S. Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez, who suggested
that Russia’s WTO accession was at risk in light of the August 2008
Russia-Georgia crisis.8
As the above exchange suggests, international trade remains a
highly politicized issue for Russia, subject to the whims of external
events. Moreover, despite the overall encouraging trends and
statistics, Russia has not been hesitant to resort to both tariff and
non-tariff barriers to defend domestic industries. In 2008, for
example, Russia imposed tariffs to limit the import of foreign cars in
an attempt to protect the country’s flagging automobile sector, as
well as export tariffs on timber to promote the domestic timber
industry.9 As for non-tariff barriers, Russian inspectors are notorious
for restricting U.S. poultry imports based on various existing (and
non-existing) health and safety grounds.10 Major international energy
projects also have stalled while Russian authorities investigated
highly technical violations of Russia’s environmental laws.11
7. See Mike Moore, Director-General, WTO, Speech at High Level Round
Table on “Russia, the International Economy and the World Trade Organization”
(Mar. 30, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm
56_e.htm (acknowledging positive Russian efforts to modernize its legislation and
enforcement structure for agricultural subsidies but noting that Russia is currently
not in compliance with WTO requirements for membership). See generally
Bogdan Lissovolik & Yaroslav Lissovolik, Russia and the WTO: The “Gravity” of
Outsider Status 39 (IMF Working Paper WP/04/159, 2004), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04159.pdf (presenting a timeline
of Russian WTO accession, from Russia’s initial request for accession in 1993 up
to the status of negotiations in 2004).
8. See Smolchenko, supra note 6 (indicating that Russia’s First Deputy Prime
Minister Igor Shuvalov believed Gutierrez was contradicting his earlier vow to
support Russia’s WTO accession).
9. See Nikolaus von Twickel, Trade Spats, Visas to Top EU Talks, MOSCOW
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009 (reporting that Russian protectionist trade practices in certain
sectors, including the automotive and timber industries, have jeopardized WTO
negotiations and trade talks with the E.U.).
10. See, e.g., Restrictions on Imports to Aid Poultry Plants, MOSCOW TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2009 (suggesting that efforts to restrict the importation of U.S. poultry
due to purported traces of antibiotics may positively affect Russia’s domestic
poultry industry).
11. See Andrew Kramer, A Mix of Oil and Environmentalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 2006, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/06/business/world
business/06sakhalin.html?scp=1&sq=Kramer&st=nyt (reporting that industry
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Thus, Russia’s actual record often fails to follow its rhetoric on
international trade. In particular, the passage of the Law on Foreign
Investment in Strategic Sectors (“Strategic Sectors Law”) in 2008
raised the specter of increased Russian protectionism.12 This law
represented one of Putin’s last official acts as president and came
into force on May 7, 2008, literally the day that President Medvedev
took the oath of office.13 The Strategic Sectors Law establishes
certain procedures for foreign investors—and groups that include a
foreign investor—that possess an equity interest in a business “of
strategic importance for national defense and state security, and (or)
consummate transactions to gain majority interest in the equity” of
such entities.14 The law covers an expansive list of so-designated
“key” industries, including: aviation, mining, encryption, nuclear
development, space, arms production, telecommunications, fishing,
certain types of publishing activities, and television and radio
broadcast media covering half the country.15 In total, the Strategic
Sectors Law recognizes forty-two types of activities as being of
strategic importance to national defense and state security.16
It must be emphasized that foreign companies are not necessarily
prohibited under this statute from purchasing an equity interest in
these strategic companies; however, they first must undergo a
national security review set forth in the Strategic Sectors Law before

analysts believe Russia’s selective enforcement of environmental policies is
designed to force the renegotiation of pricey energy contracts made in the 1990s).
12. Federal’nyi zakon ot 29 aprelia 2008 goda N 57-FZ “O poriadke
osyshchestvleniia inostrannykh investitsii v khoziaistvennye obshchestva,
imeiushchie strategicheskoe znachenie dlia obespecheniia oborony strany i
bezopasnosti gosudarstva,” ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [Ros. Gaz.] [Russian newspaper]
May 7, 2008, art. 2 [hereinafter Strategic Sectors Law], available at
http://www.rg.ru/2008/05/07/investicii-fz-dok.html (English translation available
at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/legislation/20300.shtml); see also Toby Gati,
Russia’s New Law on Foreign Investment in Strategic Sectors and the Role of State
Corporations in the Russian Economy 12-13, 21 (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.akin
gump.com/files/upload/Foreign_Investment%20in%20Russian%20Strategic%20S
ectors%20-%20by%20Toby%20T.%20Gati.pdf (asserting that the Strategic
Sectors Law is reflective of Russia’s “general wariness towards foreign
investment”).
13. Strategic Sectors Law, supra note 12.
14. Id. art. 1.
15. Id. art. 6.
16. Id.
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consummating such a transaction.17 To summarize, the following
purchase thresholds and related requirements trigger a mandatory
review. Foreign companies are required to undergo a security review
of the transaction where they are seeking: (1) to purchase a
“controlling interest” (usually more than fifty percent) in a business
operating in a strategic industry; (2) the right to select the single
executive body of a company and/or at least half of the members of a
collegial executive body; or (3) to otherwise transfer the rights to
control the company’s decisions.18 For certain industries owning
rights to natural resources (i.e., companies holding so-designated
“subsoil plots of federal significance”), a ten percent equity purchase
triggers a review.19 In addition, for a foreign government-controlled
entity, approval is required if the proposed transaction will result in
the right to manage, either directly or indirectly, twenty-five percent
of the strategic company.20
If a foreign transaction meets one of the above criteria, or any
other acquisition condition articulated under the Strategic Sectors
Law, then a foreign investor must follow the application process set
forth in the statute to obtain final approval of the transaction.21
Numerous materials are required for this process, including the
founding documents of the petitioner, a description of the petitioner’s
main activities over the past two years, and a draft business plan.22
All these materials are ultimately collected by the Federal AntiMonopoly Service and reviewed by the Commission for Foreign
17. Id. arts. 1, 7.
18. Id. arts. 7.1.1(a)-(b), 7.1.6.
19. Id. art. 7.1.2; see also Baker & McKenzie, Russia Enacts New Law on
Foreign Investments in Strategic Areas (June 2008), http://www.bakernet.com/
BakerNet/Locations/Europe+Middle+East/Offices/Russia/Press+Releases/RussiaF
oreignInvestmentsJun08.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (acknowledging that
additional ownership restrictions are placed on companies developing natural
resource deposits on the Russian continental shelf).
20. Strategic Sectors Law, supra note 12, art. 7.1.5 (reducing the requisite
percentage to five percent where the foreign government-controlled entity seeks
direct or indirect control of the strategic company through ownership of voting
shares).
21. Id. art. 8.
22. Id. art. 8.2.1 – 8.2.11. The Strategic Sectors Law also provides that when
entities are unsure if their ownership or control levels trigger the national security
review, they may send an enquiry to “the authorized body” in order to determine
whether a review is required. Id. art. 8.6.
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Investment Control (“Commission”), headed by the Russian prime
minister. Thus, it may be more than coincidence that Putin signed the
Strategic Sectors Law in April 2008 as president and then, a few
months later, found himself in charge of the law’s chief decisionmaking body.23 In theory, the entire review process should take no
longer than three months from the time that a petition is registered,
although in certain “exceptional” circumstances, this time period
may be extended an additional three months.24 Failure to follow the
designated approval process will result in the nullification of any
acquisition.25
Russia, of course, is by no means the only country that takes into
account national security considerations when reviewing foreign
investments. The U.S. Department of Treasury’s Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) regularly reviews
foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies that may have national
security implications.26 CFIUS successfully maintained a low-profile
until its controversial approval in 2006 of an acquisition by Dubai
Ports World (a United Arab Emirates company) of several major
U.S. seaports.27 The uproar surrounding this proposed transaction,
and the potential national security ramifications of a Middle East
company operating major port facilities in the United States,
ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of Dubai Ports World’s offer.
Moreover, in the aftermath of this controversy, Congress introduced
several changes to the CFIUS process under the Foreign Investment
and National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”). Pursuant to FINSA,
the director of national intelligence now serves as a non-voting, ex
officio member of CFIUS.28 The scope of national security reviews
23. See Christopher Kenneth, Putin to Play a Decisive Role in the Strategic
Sectors Law Enforcement, RUSS. CORP. WORLD, Nov. 2008, at 11-12, available at
http://www.trcw.ru/en/articles/detail.php?ID=398 (suggesting “that Putin will have
the final say in deciding the candidacies of the strategic foreign investors deemed
eligible to invest” not only per the requirements of the Strategic Sectors Law, but
also in connection with what Russia deems to be of importance to its national
security when it applies the law).
24. Strategic Sectors Law, supra note 12, art. 11.4.
25. Id. art. 15.1.
26. 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.101, 800.203 (2008).
27. See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, You Can’t Be CFIUS, WALL ST. J., Jul. 13, 2006,
at A8 (suggesting the issuance of an executive order increasing CFIUS’
transparency and cooperation with Congress).
28. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(4)(D) (2007) (restricting the Director’s ability to
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has also expanded to cover transactions affecting critical
infrastructure, including energy transactions.29
As the U.S. experience demonstrates, Russia clearly is not unique
in weighing the national security implications associated with foreign
investment. The first informal reports regarding the Strategic Sectors
Law’s implementation remain rather inconclusive. The Russian
newspaper Vedomosti reported that, as of February 5, 2009 the
Federal Anti-Monopoly Service had received forty-five applications,
of which two had been approved.30 The applications covered such
industries as space equipment building, natural resources, and
transport, although no detailed information was provided.
What cannot be quantified, of course, is how many deals have
been put on hold—or abandoned—as a result of this legislation. Not
surprisingly, the overall reaction among foreign investors to the
implementation of the Strategic Sectors Law has been mixed. On the
positive side, the law clarified what had been a very muddled picture
as to how the Russian government would proceed with transactions
in the so-designated strategic sector. Defined procedures now exist
that, at least in theory, should make the process more straightforward. The problem, of course, is that Russia has established an
expensive, time consuming, document intensive, and still less-thantransparent process that may end up discouraging, rather than
promoting, foreign investment.31 Moreover, a huge uproar among
make policy decisions except with respect to whether a transaction constitutes a
national security threat).
29. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f)(6) (2007); see also 31 C.F.R. § 800.203
(defining “critical infrastructure” as “a system or asset, whether physical or virtual,
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of the particular
system or asset . . . would have a debilitating impact on national security”).
30. See Dmitry Kaz’min, Zakryt lazeiki, VEDOMOSTI, Feb. 5, 2009 (indicating
that the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service plans to limit the ability of other
governmental agencies to submit comments in order to streamline the petitioning
process); see also Laura M. Brank & Daria Litvinova, The Impact of the Strategic
Sectors Law: Six Months In, AMCHAM NEWS, Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 23, 24, available
at http://www.amchamnews.ru/issue85/impact_law (asserting that the two
transactions approved by the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service provided little insight
into the way the commission will actually apply the Strategic Sectors Law).
31. See Dmitry Dmitriev & Anna Bogacheva, The Strategic Sectors Law – The
First Year of Enforcement, RUSS. BUS. WATCH, 2009, available at
https://www.usrbc.org/pics/Image/RBW/Spring2009/PDF/Legal1.pdf (suspecting
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foreign investors would undoubtedly ensue if the Russian
government began to actively use the Strategic Sectors Law to reject
foreign investment.
Of course, at the top of this regulatory pyramid now sits Prime
Minister Putin in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission for
Foreign Investment Control. How he chooses to exercise his new
powers overseeing foreign investment in the national defense and
strategic sectors—and how western businesses respond to his
ultimate oversight—remains one of the great unknown variables in
the implementation of this law. Putin did announce on February 5,
2009 his desire to close certain loopholes in the Strategic Sectors
Law.32 Putin specifically expressed his concern that “gaps” in the law
allow “some of our economic entities to circumvent the law’s
provisions and evade clearance for deals with strategic assets.”33 At
the same time, the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service discussed
possible changes to the law, most notably an amendment increasing
the Commission’s authority to request supplemental materials from
applicants.34
But, in addition to closing these loopholes, Putin also discussed
the possibility of simplifying the application procedures for “good
faith” investors, as well as the need to reach out to foreign
investors.35 Putin noted the challenges ahead in terms of attracting
foreign investment to Russia: “A rather intense rivalry for investment
resources will unfold in the period of post-crisis development and
recovery. . . . And our task is to work actively on creating the most
favorable conditions for bringing this investment into our
economy.”36

that potential foreign investors have underestimated the difficulty of meeting the
Strategic Sectors Law’s informational and timing requirements).
32. Anatoly Medestsky, Putin Wants Loopholes Closed, MOSCOW TIMES, Feb.
5, 2009.
33. Id.
34. See Kaz’min, supra note 30 (discussing also amendments to the Strategic
Sectors Law that would close loopholes that allow subsidiaries of foreign
companies to bypass the law).
35. See Medetsky, supra note 32 (recognizing that simplified procedures are
one method of attracting additional foreign investment).
36. Id.
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It remains unclear to what extent foreign companies, including
foreign companies owned by Russians, are exploiting loopholes in
the Strategic Sectors Law. Foreign companies theoretically can
exercise “control” over a strategic asset even without meeting the
law’s equity threshold or definition of control, for example, via
secret shareholder agreements. Moreover, offshore transactions
between two foreign companies where the seller owns or otherwise
“controls” a Russian strategic asset theoretically now require a
strategic review under the Strategic Sectors Law as well. Foreign
companies finding themselves in such a predicament will have to
weigh several options; they can either avail themselves of the
existing review procedures, ignore the law and run the risk of getting
caught, or simply abandon the deal.
One can only speculate how the 2008 global economic crisis will
affect the Strategic Sectors Law and any possible resurgence in
Russian protectionism. Many of Russia’s strategic industries would
now seemingly welcome international investment, so it would clearly
be to Russia’s economic disadvantage to discourage foreign
investment via the strict enforcement of Strategic Sectors Law.37
Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Shuvalov, also indicated
in March 2009 that the Russian government would no longer
immediately oppose the purchase of Russian debt by foreign
companies in certain strategic sector industries.38 While Shuvalov
never explicitly referred to the Strategic Sectors Law, his statement
seemed to give a green light for investing in Russia’s strategic
industries.39

37. See Annie Ferris-Rotman, Crisis May Open Doors to West, MOSCOW
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009 (indicating that Russia’s willingness to accept foreign
investment in the energy sector, as demonstrated by an Indian company’s takeover
of the “Russia-focused” Imperial Energy company, surprised most investors).
38. See Renata Iambaeva et al., Inostrantsev vziali v dolg, KOMMERS., Mar. 20,
2009, available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1140652
(reporting that the administration views foreign investment as an alternative to a
government rescue).
39. On September 15, 2009 presidential aide Arkady Dvorkovich announced
that Russia intends to adjust its laws to make foreign investment easier in strategic
sectors. Kremlin: Russia to Ease Investment Rules, REUTERS, Sept. 15, 2009,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/RussiaInvestment09/idUSTRE58E5U5
20090915.
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While Russia—at least in its public statements—appears to
appreciate the negative economic consequences of protectionism, it
is only beginning to understand the political ramifications of such a
policy. Russia’s unparalleled growth from 2001 through 2007
resulted in an upsurge of imports, most notably, in the automobile
sector.40 Thus, when the Russian government imposed import tariffs
on automobiles in 2008 to protect the domestic industry,41
demonstrations erupted throughout the country. One of the loudest
protests occurred in Vladivostok in December 2008.42 It turns out
that the economy of the Russian Far East was highly dependent on
the import of automobiles from Japan, and numerous local
businesses were involved in the repair and service of these vehicles.
As a result, motorists took to the streets in Vladivostok, demanding
the removal of these tariffs. Some protesters also voiced political
demands, and the Kremlin ultimately became so concerned that it
flew Moscow riot police to Vladivostok to quash the
demonstrations.43
But while the protests in Vladivostok and other regions clearly
rattled the Kremlin, they failed to persuade the Russian government
to change course; used car imports subsequently fell by ninety-five
percent in the first quarter of 2009 as a result of the new tariffs.44
40. See Adam Gallagher & Yuri Shumilov, Overview of the Russian
Restructuring Market: A Time of Change, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 28 (Feb
2009) (noting that since the 1998 financial crisis, Russia has averaged a seven
percent annual growth rate); see also Russian Automobile Market Shows Rapid
Growth, RNCOS, May 28, 2007, http://www.rncos.com/Blog/2007/05/RussianAutomobile-Market-Shows-Rapid-Growth.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009)
(reporting a sixty-three percent increase in sales of foreign cars in 2006, and
attributing the growing demand to a swelling middle class and greater disposable
income among consumers).
41. Michael Schwirtz & Clifford J. Levy, As Economy Sinks, Russians Protest,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/
01/world/europe/01russia.html?scp=1&sq=MichaelSchwirtzandProtest&st=cse.
42. See id. (indicating that officials violently put down the protest).
43. See id. (noting that the government’s forceful response was widely
condemned); see also Vladimir Ryzhkov, Opinion, Putin’s Biggest New Year’s
Wish,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Dec.
26,
2008,
available
at
http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=27939 (acknowledging
that the protests in Vladivostok precipitated additional political demands, which
included demands for Putin’s resignation, the end of media censorship, and the
reinstatement of the previous presidential term limits).
44. See Challenge to New Car Tariffs Rejected, MOSCOW TIMES, May 22, 2009
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Other protectionist clouds loom on the horizon as well. Most notably,
Russia’s unexpected decision in June 2009 to resubmit its application
to the WTO as part of a loosely based “customs union” with
Kazakhastan and Belarus means that WTO accession, which requires
Russia to lower tariffs and open major sectors of its economy to
foreign competition, appears years away.45
The Strategic Sectors Law represents another variable in judging
Russia’s overall commitment to open markets. Ironically, it has been
a Russian company that appears to have become the most entangled
in the tentacles of the legislation. In June 2009, the Commission for
Foreign Investment Control put off Basic Element’s (owned by Oleg
Deripaska) purchase of the Russian oil company RussNeft.46 The
transaction was delayed primarily because of the buyer’s
complicated corporate structure involving almost 100 offshore
companies. Vice-Premier Igor Sechin seemed slightly bemused that
legislation designed to review foreign investment had instead
ensnarled a Russian investor.47 But while Sechin was pleased that
Basic Element had followed the demands of the Strategic Sectors
Law, he still voiced his preference that the final purchaser be a
registered Russian company.48
The prospect of growing protectionism—whether through the
Strategic Sectors Law, a retreat from WTO commitments, or other
tariff and non-tariff measures—remains high in Russia, despite all
statements to the contrary. Indeed, the uncertainty surrounding
(stating that used car imports decreased from 120,300 in the first quarter of 2008 to
4,929 in the first quarter of 2009); Car Import Tariffs Won’t Be Changed,
MOSCOW TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009 (reporting that a government committee has
extended the existing car tariffs until at least May 2010).
45. Aleksei Shapovalov et al., VTO Polychila Optovoe Predlozhenie,
KOMMERS., June 19, 2009, available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?Docs
ID=1189454.
46. See Denis Rebrov, “Russneft” dlia russkikh, KOMMERS., June 8, 2009,
available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1184916 (reporting that
the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service has not submitted a final decision on Basic
Element’s application to purchase RussNeft because of incomplete
documentation).
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Elena Mazneva & Alena Chehel, Slozhno pokupaete,
VEDOMOSTI, June 9, 2009, at B2 (informing that the Director of the Federal AntiMonopoly Service echoes Sechin’s concerns about the nationality of final
purchasers).
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Russia’s general commitment to open markets represents one of
(admittedly) several reasons why FDI declined by some forty-five
percent during the first six months of 2009.49 But as this article
demonstrates, it is not simply Russia’s economic growth that is
threatened by a further retreat from free trade. Any additional
protectionist measures would hold considerable risks for the Russian
government, testing the country’s already strained relations with its
international trading partners and potentially creating new tensions in
Russian domestic politics as well.

49. See Alex Nicholson & Paul Abelsky, Foreign Investment Declines 45% in
H1, MOSCOW TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009 (attributing the decrease in FDI also to
unfavorable credit markets and uncertainties in the Russian and global financial
markets).

